A valid session from a risky device
The account is authenticated, but a mandatory protection signal has failed or become stale. Policy evaluates that device state separately before granting the requested resource.
DEVICE TRUST
Device Trust keeps user identity, device identity, posture evidence, and resource policy separate. A valid sign-in does not turn an unknown, stale, or compromised device into a trusted device.
System role: Oten Endpoint + Access Control Plane
Evaluation depends on: Requires enrollment, baseline posture evidence, explainable Health Score inputs, and resource-aware policy assignment.
OPERATING SCENARIOS
The account is authenticated, but a mandatory protection signal has failed or become stale. Policy evaluates that device state separately before granting the requested resource.
Credentials may still exist after physical control or device ownership changes. Device identity can be revoked without treating every credential as the same object.
Payroll, source control, and production can require different evidence freshness, identity assurance, and mandatory device conditions.
Provider failure remains Unknown or Stale. It does not silently inherit a passing result from another provider or an old observation.
Only signed last-known-good authority can continue within its bounded lease. Expiry cannot be extended by local clock rollback or a process restart.
The experience identifies the affected resource, failed condition, last observation, and approved remediation channel without exposing sensitive detection detail.
An administrator or user starts enrollment through an approved organizational policy.
The Agent creates or uses a device key protected by the platform trust store or hardware when supported.
The Control Plane validates enrollment evidence, organization binding, and device ownership.
The Agent collects only posture evidence authorized by policy.
Checks produce explicit results, freshness, and reason codes; unknown evidence never becomes a pass.
ZTNA, Gateway, and PAM policies can require the resulting device trust state.
Users receive remediation guidance; administrators can quarantine or revoke the device.
Secure Boot, TPM or Secure Enclave availability, supported OS state, and Agent release integrity.
OS version, critical updates, screen lock, firewall, and required local security configuration.
Full-disk encryption and the precise required versus observed state for the platform.
Anti-malware or EDR state, evidence provider, timestamp, and subscription or entitlement health.
Enrollment state, organization binding, device key or certificate, and management status.
Qualified EDR, tamper, anomalous behavior, or administrator quarantine signals and their policy effect.
Current evidence satisfies the policy required for the requested resource.
A noncritical issue or bounded grace period is active, with a deadline and remediation path.
Some resources remain available, while resources requiring failed conditions are denied.
A mandatory gate fails for the requested resource; the UI explains the safe reason and next action.
Security or administrator response isolates business access while preserving approved management channels.
Evidence is older than policy allows; last observation time and offline behavior remain visible.
REMEDIATION
Show the affected resource, safe reason code, evidence source, last observation, and policy owner without exposing sensitive detection data.
Quarantine can retain approved management, update, support, and remediation channels while removing business-resource access.
Access returns only after fresh qualified evidence produces a new policy decision and the required enforcement points confirm the outcome.
MACOS AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY
On managed macOS configurations that add desktop MFA, Oten does not replace the macOS password verifier or store the user's password. Apple's builtin:authenticate mechanism remains responsible for local password verification. Oten adds a separate, policy-controlled authorization decision through split AuthDevice mechanisms and ogc-core.
The non-privileged OGCAuthDeviceUI mechanism renders bounded login, MFA, or recovery input. It does not connect to the root-private Core service or evaluate policy.
The privileged OGCAuthDevicePrivileged mechanism validates the authorization context and is the only mechanism that communicates with the dedicated ogc-core AuthDevice service.
ogc-core evaluates signed policy, verifies online or offline recovery proof, consumes recovery credentials durably before allow, and returns an explicit result.
FileVault pre-boot, local password verification, Platform SSO, and the Oten MFA decision remain distinct responsibilities. Password synchronization is a deployment choice, not a universal device-trust invariant.
FAILURE AND RECOVERY
When ogc-core cannot answer before the authorization deadline, the privileged mechanism applies only the signed installation-time emergency directive for that device and authorization right.
The authorization transaction is denied. The UI cannot choose a more permissive result and no cached dynamic policy is evaluated inside the plugin.
A degraded transaction can proceed only when the signed directive permits that exact scope and an append-only emergency audit record is durable before allow.
A missing or invalid directive, corrupt or full audit spool, or an out-of-scope authorization right results in deny. The system never presents emergency bypass as successful MFA.
After Core recovery, ogc-core reconciles and uploads emergency records, marks the bypass as degraded evidence, and triggers the required policy re-evaluation.
FAQ
No. Oten can claim non-exportable, hardware-backed device keys only for the platforms, enrollment modes, and evidence paths that have been verified. Other platforms must show their actual storage and assurance state.
No. Health Score summarizes posture and risk with explainable contributing evidence. Resource policy and mandatory gates remain authoritative, including revocation, expired authority, failed critical posture, and confirmed security verdicts.
A device may preserve only qualified, signed last-known-good authority within bounded policy and evidence leases. The UI must show last synchronization, expiry, and the current enforcement mode. It cannot invent new authority while orphaned.
Next in Oten Access
See how Oten Endpoint qualifies evidence and how the Access Control Plane uses it without overstating platform assurance.